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Can Crop Purchase Programs Reduce Poverty and Improve 
Welfare in Rural Communities? 
Evidence from the Food Reserve Agency in Zambia 
 
The last decade has seen a resurgence of parastatal crop marketing institutions in sub-
Saharan Africa, many of which cite improving food security and incomes as key goals. 
However, there is limited empirical evidence on the welfare effects of these programs. This 
article considers one such program, the Zambian Food Reserve Agency (FRA), which 
purchases maize from smallholder farmers at a pan-territorial price that typically exceeds 
maize market prices in surplus production areas. Using both fixed effects and an instrumental 
variables approach combined with correlated random effects, we estimate the effects of the 
FRA’s maize marketing activities on smallholder farm household welfare. Results suggest 
that FRA activities have positive direct welfare effects on the small minority of smallholder 
households that are able to sell to it. However, the results also suggest negative indirect FRA 
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In recent years, marketing boards have again become commonplace in eastern and southern 
Africa. The recent rise in crop marketing boards can be linked to the potential of these 
agencies in addressing key challenges of smallholder farmer access to output markets and 
price stability for producers and consumers. Despite their proliferation, there is limited 
empirical evidence as to how the activities of these marketing boards are affecting crop 
markets and even less on the welfare effects of these programs. This paper begins to fill this 
gap by empirically estimating the effects of the activities of the Zambian Food Reserve 
Agency (FRA) on the economic well-being of smallholder farmers. The FRA is a parastatal 
grain marketing board/strategic food reserve. Its goal is to ensure national food security and 
stabilize crop prices by maintaining a national strategic food reserve. 
 
The authors find that despite FRA’s core value of wealth creation for farmers and its being 
one of the  Zambian government’s two flagship agricultural sector Poverty Reduction 
Programs, its effects on smallholder  welfare are mixed.  Specifically the results suggest that 
FRA activities have positive direct effects on the small minority of smallholder households 
that are able to sell to it. However, the results also suggest negative indirect FRA effects, as 
higher levels of FRA activity in a district are associated with higher levels of poverty. This 
research adds to the growing literature that highlights the unintended negative consequences 
of well-intended program interventions in developing countries. 
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Introduction 
Historically, agricultural policies and crop marketing institutions in developed countries
1
 
tended to subsidize farmers at the expense of urban consumers, whereas such policies and 
institutions in developing countries often taxed farmers
2
 to the benefit of urban 
consumers (Barrett and Mutambatsere 2005). Following the push for government exit 
from private markets that accompanied structural adjustment policies in the 1980s and 
1990s, numerous government or parastatal crop marketing boards throughout the 
developing world were completely dismantled or had their activities markedly scaled 
back. However, in recent years, increasing attention is being paid to the potential for crop 
marketing boards to address key challenges of smallholder access to output markets and 
price stability for producers and consumers (Jayne, Myers, and Nyoro 2008; Chapoto and 
Jayne 2009; Jayne, Chapoto, and Govereh 2010; Mason and Myers 2013; Mason, Jayne, 
and Myers 2015). Though now sometimes restricted to the management of strategic grain 
reserves or insurance against extraordinary price fluctuations, such marketing boards 
have again become commonplace in eastern and southern Africa (ibid.). However, there 
is limited empirical evidence about how the activities of these marketing boards are 
affecting crop markets and even less on the welfare effects of these programs.  
This article begins to fill this gap by empirically estimating the effects of the 
activities of the Zambian Food Reserve Agency (FRA) on the economic well-being of 
smallholder farmers.
3
 The FRA, a parastatal grain marketing board/strategic food reserve, 
was established by the Food Reserve Act of 1995. The FRA’s goal is to ensure national 
food security and stabilize crop prices by maintaining a national strategic food reserve 
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(FRA n.d.). FRA’s crop marketing activities have focused almost exclusively on maize, 
and the Agency is the country’s dominant buyer of maize in most years (table 1). It 
purchases maize from farmers at its depots throughout rural Zambia at a pan-territorial 
price that is typically higher than the wholesale private sector price in major maize-
producing areas (Govereh, Jayne, and Chapoto 2008; Chapoto and Jayne 2009; Mason 
and Myers 2013; Mason, Jayne, and Myers 2015). It then stores the maize, exports it or 
sells it on the domestic market at potentially below-market prices (mainly to select large-
scale millers to be ground into maize meal, and occasionally to traders or the general 
public) (ibid.).  
Although selling to FRA at above-market prices has the potential to increase 
farmer incomes and improve their food security, FRA activities could also have 
unintended, negative effects on Zambian producers and consumers, particularly those 
who are not able to sell to FRA. For example, FRA’s pricing and buying/selling activities 
are rarely announced in advance, and when they are, pronouncements are rarely 
respected. This creates a great deal of uncertainty in Zambian maize markets and 
discourages involvement by traders and other private sector actors at various levels of the 
maize value chain (Sitko and Kuteya 2013). Furthermore, FRA’s maize marketing 
activities tend to siphon maize out of rural markets and concentrate it at main FRA depots 
in the district, provincial, and national capitals; this puts upward pressure on private 
sector wholesale and retail maize prices to the benefit of maize net sellers but to the 
detriment of rural maize net buyers and urban consumers (Mason and Myers 2013; Sitko 
and Kuteya 2013).
4
 The concentration of maize at FRA depots also means that less grain 
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is circulating in rural and urban markets, making it difficult for consumers to source grain 
and mill it into maize meal at hammermills – typically a more affordable option than 
buying maize meal produced in large-scale commercial mills (Mason and Jayne 2009; 
Sitko and Kuteya 2013). Moreover, analysis by Mason and Myers (2013) suggests that 
FRA activities stabilized maize prices between 1996 and 2008, but that this price 
stabilization is likely to have mainly benefited large-scale farmers.   
Only a small minority of smallholders sells maize to the FRA (e.g., 10% of all 
smallholders in 2007/08 and 27% in 2011/12), and these tend to be wealthier households 
with more land (Mason, Jayne, and Myers 2015; see also table 2). Although such farmers 
may earn higher incomes from these sales due to the above-market prices typically 
offered by the Agency, given their already elevated wealth status, this may have little or 
no impact on rural poverty rates, which have remained near 80% since the FRA was 
established (Mason, Jayne, and Myers 2015).
5
 Moreover, given the myriad of potential 
unintended consequences of FRA operations, the net welfare effects of FRA activities on 
Zambian smallholders are difficult to predict a priori. This is despite FRA’s core value of 
wealth creation for farmers and its being one of the Zambian government’s two flagship 
agricultural sector Poverty Reduction Programs (FRA n.d.).
6
  
This paper contributes to the literature in three main ways. First, it adds to the thin 
knowledge base on the effects of the FRA and similar post-structural adjustment crop 
marketing boards on the welfare of African smallholders. While several studies have 
considered the effects of these agencies on maize market prices (Jayne, Myers, and 
Nyoro 2008; Mason and Myers 2013) or smallholder crop production patterns (Mather 
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and Jayne 2011; Mason, Jayne, and Myers 2015), to the best of our knowledge, only 
Mghenyi, Myers, and Jayne (2011) and Mather and Jayne (2011) have quantified the 
effects of these programs on rural households’ economic well-being. Mghenyi, Myers, 
and Jayne (2011) estimate the welfare effects of a large, discrete maize price increase in 
Kenya on rural income and poverty. They attribute this price increase to the Kenyan 
National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) but do not directly estimate the welfare 
effects of changes in the level of NCPB activities. Mather and Jayne (2011), also 
studying the case of Kenya, estimate the impacts of the NCPB on rural net crop income. 
While they find positive effects of NCPB activities during the previous season on current 
season net crop income, they do not consider the effects of current season NCPB 
activities, nor do they investigate the effects of the NCPB on total household income, 
poverty, or other welfare indicators.  
The second contribution of this paper is that it is the first to econometrically 
estimate the effects of the Zambian FRA on smallholder incomes and poverty. While 
previous studies have speculated about the welfare effects of the FRA based on other 
empirical findings, none have explicitly estimated the welfare effects of the FRA. For 
example, Mason and Myers (2013) estimate the effects of the FRA on maize market 
prices, and discuss the likely distributional effects of the higher and more stable prices 
brought about by FRA activities. Mason, Jayne, and Myers (2015) estimate the effects of 
FRA’s purchase quantities and prices on smallholder area planted with maize versus 
other crops, as well as crop yields and quantities harvested. They find that an increase in 
the lagged FRA farm gate price raises smallholders’ maize price expectations, which 
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induces a maize production response through area expansion (extensification) but not 
through increased yields (intensification). They find no evidence of statistically 
significant FRA effects on the production of other crops. Their estimates suggest that the 
maize supply response is very small and mainly among relatively better-off smallholders 
with more land. They argue that FRA activities are therefore unlikely to have major 
impacts on rural poverty, although they do not test this directly. Sitko and Kuteya (2013) 
contend that the FRA’s maize marketing activities are likely responsible for the paradox 
of higher maize prices in Zambia in recent years despite consecutive bumper maize 
harvests, and discuss the likely distributional effects. Though relevant, none of these 
studies explicitly estimates the welfare effects of the FRA. 
The third contribution of this article is that it estimates both the direct effects of a 
household’s own sales to the FRA on its welfare, as well as the indirect effects of greater 
FRA activity in a district on the welfare of households in that district. Previous studies 
focus mainly on the direct effects, but given the discussion above, there are several 
indirect pathways through which FRA activities could positively or negatively affect 
smallholder welfare. It is possible that the indirect effects of the FRA could be larger than 
its direct effects. In addition given our findings, this article adds to the growing literature 
that highlights the unintended negative consequences of well-intended program 
interventions in developing countries. 
To estimate the direct and indirect effects of the FRA on the incomes and poverty 
status of Zambian smallholders, we use household panel survey data spanning years 
before and during the scale-up of FRA activities, and exploit household- and district-level 
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differences in maize sales to the FRA.
7
  We use both a fixed effects (FE) approach and an 
instrumental variables (IV) approach combined with correlated random effects to control 
for time invariant heterogeneity and correct for the potential endogeneity of household-
level sales to the FRA. Our results suggest that FRA activities have positive direct effects 
on households that sell to it. However, the results also suggest negative indirect FRA 
effects on smallholder welfare: an increase in district-level maize purchases by the FRA 
is associated with higher poverty incidence, gap and severity. We explore the pathways 
through which these effects occur. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
briefly describe the data used in the analysis. We then present the conceptual model, the 
empirical approach and results. We conclude with a discussion of the policy implications 
of these results.  
 
Data   
The data are drawn mainly from the Zambia Supplemental Survey to the 1999/2000 Post-
Harvest Survey (SS), a nationally representative, three-wave longitudinal survey of 
smallholder farm households implemented by the Central Statistical Office (CSO), 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO), and the Food Security Research 
Project (FSRP) in mid-2001, 2004, and 2008. The SS covers the 1999/2000, 2002/03, and 
2006/07 agricultural years (October-September) and the subsequent crop marketing years 
(May-April of 2000/01, 2003/04, and 2007/08).
8
 The SS contains detailed information on 
household demographics, crop production and sales, livestock activities, income from all 
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on- and off-farm sources, and other socio-economic factors.  Of the 6,922 households 
interviewed in the first wave of the SS, 5,358 (77%) were interviewed in the second 
wave; and of those, 4,286 (80%) were interviewed in the third wave. The balanced panel 
therefore consists of 4,286 households and 12,858 observations (4,286 households times 
three survey waves). Given attrition between survey waves, there is the potential for 
attrition bias, so we test for it using the regression-based approach described in 
Wooldridge (2010, p. 837). We fail to reject the null hypothesis of no attrition bias 
(p>0.34) for all dependent variables used in the article. For more information on the SS 
data, attrition rates, and sampling design see Megill (2005) and Mason, Jayne, and Myers 
(2015).  
We supplement the SS data with information from FRA administrative records on 
district-level maize purchases by the Agency each crop marketing year; geo-referenced 
rainfall data from the Tropical Applications of Meteorology using SATellite data 
(TAMSAT) (Milford and Dugdale 1990; Grimes, Pardo-Igúzquiza, and Bonifacio 1999; 
Maidment et al. 2014; Tarnavsky et al. 2014); and crop prices from CSO/MACO Post-





Rural Zambia, like most parts of rural SSA, is characterized by imperfect credit and labor 
markets as well as poor infrastructure. Consequently, our conceptual framework is based 
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on the well-established prototype of the agricultural household farm with imperfectly 
functioning markets (Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986; Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995; 
Bardhan and Udry 1999). Following Otsuka, Cordova, and David (1992) we assume that 
the agricultural household solves a constrained utility maximization problem by 
allocating its resources such as land to crop production, household labor time to various 
farm and non-farm income earning activities and capital inputs to various productive 
activities.  The household faces budget, time and endowment constraints and is subject to 
the relevant crop production functions. The solution to this constrained utility 
maximization problem yields a reduced form for household income as a function of 
factor prices (𝒘) and product prices in expectation as of planting time (𝒑𝒆), household 
labor supply (𝒍) and land (𝑨) as well as other household characteristics (𝒛) such as non-
land assets, variables that are likely to affect the household’s production environment, 
shocks likely to affect income and other socio-demographic variables.
9
 Consequently, the 
reduced form of household income can be expressed as follows: 
(1)                𝑦 = 𝑓(𝒘, 𝒑𝒆, 𝑨, 𝒍,, 𝒛)   
In this article, we consider both the direct and indirect effects of household maize 
sales to and purchases by the FRA on household income. A household’s income can be 
directly affected through its sale of maize to the FRA. The intensity of FRA activity in a 
household’s district of residence could also indirectly affect the household’s income 
through various channels.
10
 For example, an increase in maize purchases at above-market 
prices by the FRA in a district could put upward pressure on private sector maize prices 
in the district (Mason and Myers 2013). Thus, holding maize production constant, an 
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increase in household farm income could come through increased sales to FRA or 
through an increase in the price farmers receive for maize sold to private sector buyers.
11
  
It is also possible that an increase in FRA activity could result in lower private 
sector prices for maize and/or other crops, resulting in lower household incomes. FRA 
activity has been shown to raise farmers’ maize price expectations and stimulate a maize 
production response (Mason, Jayne, and Myers 2015). If there is not a concomitant 
increase in maize demand, then private sector maize prices could actually fall in regions 
with higher FRA activity.
12
 Furthermore, if intense FRA activity crowds out some private 
crop traders (who are unable to compete with the FRA on price and may be involved in 
trading maize and other crops), then reduced competition and increased market power 
among the remaining traders could result in lower prices being paid to smallholder 
farmers for maize and/or other crops. On the demand side, increased maize production in 
response to FRA activities could increase household maize supply for home consumption 
and reduce the demand for other staples that are substitutes in consumption. This could 
also lower the price of these other staples, potentially resulting in lower household 
incomes. Thus, while we expect the direct effect of the FRA on household income to be 
positive (because the household is being paid a higher price for its maize), both positive 
and negative indirect FRA effects on household income are plausible. Whether the net 
indirect effect of FRA activity is positive or negative is ultimately an empirical question. 
To capture the potential direct and indirect effects of the FRA on household 
welfare in rural Zambia, we add two additional right-hand-side variables to equation (1): 
(2)                     𝑦 = 𝑓(𝒘, 𝒑𝒆, 𝑨, 𝒍,, 𝒛, 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐷 , 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐼)      
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𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐷 is intended to capture the direct effect and 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐼 captures the (net) indirect effect 
of FRA activities on household welfare. The empirical specifications of these variables 
are discussed in the next section. 
Following equation (2) above, the effects of FRA on other welfare indicators 
determined by income can also be explored. We are primarily concerned with whether 
FRA improves farmers’ incomes and reduces poverty in rural Zambia. Our income 
measures capture the various crop and non-crop income sources available to farmers, and 
our poverty measures are based on the traditional Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty 
measures (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984).    
 
Empirical Strategy  
We empirically estimate the effects of FRA’s maize purchase program on smallholder 
farmer incomes and poverty by exploiting the panel nature of the dataset. Equation (3) 
represents the basic empirical model: 
(3)             𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  ∝𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝝆𝒙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                      
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a measure of welfare for household i in year t; 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑖𝑡 are the 
direct and indirect measures of a households exposure to FRA activities. 𝒙𝑖𝑡 is a vector of 
other regressors that affect household welfare (more details below); ∝𝑖 are time-invariant 
household-specific effects; 𝜇𝑡 are year fixed effects; 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term; 
and 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝝆 are parameters to be estimated.  
 We measure a household’s participation in FRA’s maize purchase program, the 
direct effect (𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡) in two ways: (i) a binary variable equal to one if a household sold 
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any maize to FRA in a particular year, and equal to zero otherwise; and (ii) the quantity 
(in kg) of maize sold by the household to FRA. The net indirect effects of the FRA (As 
discussed further below, we use panel data methods (the fixed effects estimator and the 
correlated random effects approach) to control for the time-invariant heterogeneity (∝𝑖) 
that affects household welfare and that could be correlated  and the other covariates in 
equation (). 
Broadly speaking, 𝒙𝑖𝑡 includes the determinants of household crop production and 
income per equation (2) above. Specifically, 𝑥 includes expected producer prices for the 
main crops marketed by Zambian smallholders — maize, groundnuts, beans, and sweet 
potatoes (proxied by producer prices at the previous harvest); factor prices including the 
commercial price of inorganic fertilizer and an agricultural wage rate (the median wage 
to weed 0.25 ha of land in the household’s standard enumeration area, SEA);
13
 the 
education of the household head, a dummy variable equal to one if the household head is 
male and zero otherwise, the number of household members in different age categories 
(under 5, aged 5 to 14, aged 15 to 59, aged 60 and above), household landholding size, 
and household farm assets (value of farm equipment and livestock at the beginning of the 
periods for which income is measured). To account for location-specific factors likely to 
affect households’ agricultural output and livelihood opportunities, we include various 
geographic variables at the district or SEA level: the number of moisture stress periods in 
an SEA in (agricultural) year t and the average number of moisture stress periods over the 
last 16 years;
14
 growing season rainfall in the SEA in year t and in each of the last three 
years (t-1, t-2, and t-3), and the mean and coefficient of variation of growing season 
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rainfall over the last 16 years; and the percentage of households in the district earning 
income from non-farm salaried/wage employment, from formal/informal business 
activities, and from work on others’ farms to proxy for the off-farm income-generating 
opportunities available to the household. In addition, we control for household-level 
shocks that could affect production and welfare — namely, the prime-age death of the 
male household head/spouse, the female household head/spouse, and other male or 
female household members in the last three to four years.
15
 
In addition to subsidizing maize output prices through FRA activities, the 
Zambian government has a major maize input subsidy program that provides inorganic 
fertilizer and hybrid maize seed to smallholder farmers at below-market prices. To 
account for the effects of that program, we could include as a covariate the amounts of 
government-subsidized fertilizer and seed acquired by the household.  However, these 
variables are likely to be endogenous to household welfare. Given that the welfare effects 
of the input subsidy program are not the focus of the current article (and are explored in 
detail in Mason and Tembo (2015)), and given these endogeneity concerns, we instead 
include in the regressions a more aggregated, district-level variable to control for the 
effects of the input subsidy program. More specifically, we include in the regressions the 
administratively determined quantity of government-subsidized fertilizer allocated to the 
household’s district (in MT per agricultural household).
16
 This variable is unlikely to be 
endogenous to the individual household after controlling for the other observed 
covariates and time invariant heterogeneity. Table 3 presents basic summary statistics for 
all variables used in the analysis. 
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As mentioned above, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a measure of household welfare. We consider several 
household welfare indicators: real gross income, real gross income per capita, poverty 
incidence, poverty gap, and poverty severity.  Total gross income includes crop income, 
livestock and fish-farming income, and off-farm income (from remittances, 
formal/informal business activities, salaried/wage employment, and pensions). Crop 
income is maize income plus income from other crops. Maize income is defined as the kg 
of maize sold to the FRA multiplied by the pan-territorial FRA price, plus the kg of 
maize produced but not sold to the FRA multiplied by the district-median private sector 
producer price of maize. Other crop income is defined as the gross value of crop 
production (kg of each crop produced multiplied by the provincial median crop price at 
the producer level).
17
 Real per capita income is real gross income divided by the number 
of household members. Poverty incidence is a binary variable that equals one if 
household income falls below the US$1.25/capita/day poverty line, and zero otherwise.
18
 
The poverty gap is defined as the proportional difference between household income and 
the poverty line for households with income below the poverty line, and set to zero for 
households with income above the poverty line. Poverty severity is the square of the 
poverty gap (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984).  
Our main method of identification of the effects of FRA participation on 
household welfare is based on a fixed effects (FE) approach. The FE method attenuates 
potential biases that can threaten our ability to consistently estimate the causal effects of 
FRA participation by using variation in maize sales to the FRA within a household over 
time to identify the effect of FRA. However, although the FE approach controls for time 
 15 
invariant unobserved heterogeneity that may be correlated with both FRA participation 
and household welfare, the FE approach does not deal with endogeneity caused by time-
varying unobserved heterogeneity. While we have controlled for numerous time-varying 
observables in the model, we cannot rule out the possibility that such time-varying 
unobservables still exist. 
To deal with the possible existence of time-varying unobservables that are 
correlated with both maize sales to FRA and household welfare, we also estimate an 
instrumental variables (IV) model for each measure of household welfare. We instrument 
for maize sales to the FRA using distance from the homestead to the nearest FRA depot. 
This distance was only collected in the 2008 survey wave. Given that we cannot 
instrument for maize sales to FRA in the 2001 and 2004 survey waves, we cannot use all 
three waves of data and estimate fixed effects instrumental variables (FE-IV) regressions. 
However, we can take advantage of the panel information on the other exogenous 
variables and combine the IV approach with a correlated random effects (CRE) approach 
to control for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity (Wooldridge 2010).
19
 This entails 
including in the IV regressions for 2008 the household-specific time averages (across the 
three survey waves) of the time-varying exogenous explanatory variables. In other words, 
the ‘IV-with-CRE’ models are estimated using observations on the dependent variables, 
sales to the FRA, IV, and exogenous explanatory variables as of the 2008 survey wave, 
along with the household time averages of the exogenous explanatory variables.  
Our argument for the validity of the IV is as follows. The locations of FRA depots 
are administratively determined and are beyond the control of individual households.  
 16 
While it is relatively obvious that our instrument is relevant, it is possible to argue that 
our instrument does not satisfy the exclusion restriction because the location of the FRA 
depots is not random. Although we do not claim that the locations of the FRA depots are 
random or that our instrument is unconditionally exogenous, we believe it meets the 
exogeneity criteria conditional on the controls we have highlighted above and conditional 
on controlling for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity via CRE. This means that 
conditional on the observed covariates and the time invariant heterogeneity, distance 
from the homestead to the nearest FRA depot should not be correlated with any time-
varying unobservables that are correlated with our dependent variables. It is possible, for 
example, that distance to the nearest FRA depot is correlated with the economic 
development of an area or with an area’s suitability for growing maize. These variables 
may also be correlated with our dependent variables and render the instrument invalid if 
not accounted for. However, we control for these factors via CRE and by including 
district-level fixed effects in the IV regressions as well as by including variables 
capturing the off-farm income-generating opportunities in the household’s district. It is 
therefore plausible to assume that our IV-with-CRE estimates of the effects of the FRA 
on household welfare are consistent.   
 
Results  
The results for our base model are presented in tables 4 to 7. Tables 4 and 5 present the 
FE estimates, while tables 6 and 7 present the IV-with-CRE estimates. Throughout the 
remainder of the article, we refer to the latter simply as the IV estimates. Tables 4 and 6 
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use the binary variable (sold to FRA) as our measure of FRA participation, whiles tables 
5 and 7 capture FRA participation with the kilograms of maize sold to FRA by the 
household. Columns (1)-(5) in each table highlight the estimated effects of FRA on the 
various welfare indicators: (1) gross household income, (2) per capita income, (3) poverty 
incidence, (4) poverty gap, and (5) poverty severity. For brevity, we focus our discussion 




Tables 4 and 5 indicate that direct participation in FRA’s maize purchase program 
has large, positive and statistically significant effects on farm household welfare. 
Households that sold to the FRA had higher total and per capita incomes as well as lower 
probability of household income falling below the poverty line, smaller poverty gap, and 
less severe poverty, than did other households (table 4). Selling to FRA reduces poverty 
incidence by about 8 percentage points, and the poverty gap and poverty severity by 
approximately 14 and 15 percentage points, respectively.
21
 Table 5 indicates that 
increases in the quantity of maize sold to the FRA also had positive welfare effects. The 
effect of an additional kilogram of maize sold to the FRA on total household income 
(1,775 ZMK/kg in real 2008 ZMK terms) is almost two and a half times the price offered 
by the FRA in 2007/08 (760 ZMK/kg per table 1). As expected, the per-kg effects of 
maize sold to the FRA on poverty incidence, gap, and severity are quite small (-0.0018, -
0.0013 and -0.0010 percentage points, respectively). But if we multiply these coefficients 
by the sample mean of 2,731 kg of maize sold to FRA (among those who sold to FRA, 
from table 3), we see that at the sample mean selling to FRA reduced poverty incidence, 
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gap, and severity by approximately 4.9, 3.6, and 2.7 percentage points, respectively. 
These estimates are smaller than the estimated effects of the binary indicator for selling to 
FRA in table 4, and reflect modest reductions in the poverty metrics given sample mean 
poverty incidence, gap, and severity levels of 90%, 66%, and 53%, respectively.   
The results also reveal that more intense FRA activity in a district has the indirect 
effect of reducing per capita household income (table 5) and increasing the poverty 
incidence, gap and severity (tables 4 and 5). These effects are statistically significant (at 
the 10% level or lower) and quite large in magnitude. For example, table 5 shows that the 
negative, indirect effect on per capita income of a one-kg per agricultural household 
increase in district-level sales to the FRA (-232 ZMK) is 1.8 times larger than the 
positive, direct effect of a one-kg increase in household maize sales to the FRA (130 
ZMK). Similarly, the poverty incidence, gap, and severity-increasing indirect effects of a 
one-kg increase in district-level sales to the FRA are 2.5 to 4.8 times larger than the 
poverty-reducing direct effects of household maize sales to the FRA. In other words, 
while direct sales to the FRA increase household welfare, the FE results suggest that FRA 
activities have indirect effects that are welfare-reducing for smallholder farmers in rural 
Zambia. The magnitude of the welfare-reducing indirect effects appears to exceed the 
welfare-increasing direct effects by a considerable margin. Below we explore potential 
mechanisms for these effects. 
The results from the IV estimation are presented in tables 6 and 7. The top portion 
of each of these tables shows the key parameter estimate from the first stage of the IV 
estimation: the effect of the instrument (distance to the nearest FRA depot) on FRA 
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participation. The full regression results for the first stage associated with tables 6 and 7 
are reported in table A1 in the appendix. The first stage results indicate that the distance 
to the nearest FRA depot is highly partially correlated with the decision to sell to the FRA 
and quantity sold to FRA (table A1 in the appendix). The instrument passes basic weak 
instrument tests.
22
 The IV results in Tables 6 and 7 generally support our findings in 
tables 4 and 5. They confirm that where significant, direct FRA participation improves 
household welfare. Even after controlling for any potential endogeneity of household-
level maize sales to the FRA, such sales still positively affect household total and per 
capita income, and reduce poverty incidence, poverty gap and poverty severity. The main 
difference between the FE and IV results is that both the direct effect of FRA 
participation and the indirect effects of district-level FRA activity on poverty incidence 
are no longer statistically significant in the IV estimation.
23
 However, for the poverty 
incidence regressions, Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests fail to reject the null that selling to 
FRA and quantity of maize sold to FRA are exogenous. Therefore in the poverty 
incidence cases, the FE estimates are preferred to the IV estimates.
24
 Overall, the results 
in tables 4 through 7 suggest that while directly selling to FRA leads to improvement in 
smallholder welfare, households living in a district with higher levels of FRA activity 
may face unintended, negative consequences. Specifically we find that higher levels of 
FRA activity in a district are associated with an increase in poverty incidence, gap, and 
severity among smallholder households in that district.
 25
  
Next we explore some potential mechanisms through which FRA participation 
affects the welfare of households. These results (FE and IV estimates) are presented in 
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tables 8 and 9, respectively, and show the effects of FRA participation on income from 
different sources (maize income, non-maize crop income, agricultural wage income, and 
other income).
26
 The FE results in table 8 indicate that selling to the FRA significantly 
increases maize income (as expected) while having no direct effect on non-maize crop 
income and agricultural wage income. In contrast, an increase in FRA activities in a 
district on average leads to a decline in non-maize crop income. The IV results in table 9 
in most cases suggest no significant effects from participation or quantity sold to FRA 
apart from results summarized in columns (4) and (5). Based on the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test on each specification in table 9, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
FRA participation is exogenous in the maize income, non-maize crop income, and 
agricultural wage income estimations. Hence our FE estimates in table 8 are preferred for 
the results summarized in columns (1)-(3) and (5)-(7).   
Our inference from tables 8 and 9 can be summed up as follows. Direct FRA 
participation increases maize income of participants but has little or no effect on other 
sources of income. Higher FRA activity in a district, however, leads to a decline in non-
maize crop income. The indirect FRA effect of reducing non-maize crop income of 
households in the district provides a potential channel through which FRA activity 
increases poverty incidence, gap, and severity of households in the district per tables 4 
through 7.  
Empirical evidence suggests that the negative FRA indirect effect on non-maize 
crop income comes mainly through lower non-maize crop prices as opposed to lower 
output of non-maize crops.
27
 Mason, Jayne, and Myers (2015) find no evidence of 
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statistically significant FRA effects on the production of non-maize crops; moreover, 
simple regressions of provincial-level non-maize crop prices on provincial-level maize 
purchases by FRA suggest that higher levels of FRA activity are associated with lower 
non-maize crop prices, particularly rice. Higher levels of FRA activity could result in 
lower non-maize crop prices due to FRA crowding out private crop traders. If there were 
fewer traders coming into rural areas to buy maize and other crops, the few remaining 
traders would likely have more market power and the scope to pay farmers lower prices 
for their crops. There is some evidence of lower crop trading activity as a result of the 
FRA and other similar programs (Chapoto and Jayne 2011; Sitko and Jayne 2014). For 
example, Chapoto and Jayne (2011) find that the mean number of traders visiting 
Zambian villages declined with increased government intervention in the maize market. 
Lower prices for non-maize crops could also be driven by lower demand for these crops 
due to higher maize production and consequent supply for home consumption. If maize 
production is stimulated due to FRA price incentives in districts with higher levels of 
FRA activity, this could increase maize supplies for home consumption and reduce 
demand for other staples, putting downward pressure on the prices for other staples.  
To further unpack the potential channels through which FRA activity affects non-
maize crop income, in tables 10 and 11 we present FE and IV estimates of direct and 
indirect FRA effects on income from several non-maize crop groups: other staples, high 
value food crops, and cash crops.
28
 More precisely, we measure effects on the gross value 
of production of these crop groups. The FE specifications (which are preferred over the 
IV based on the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests) indicate that where significant, selling to 
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FRA and having more FRA activity in your district both reduce the gross value of other 
staples produced by the household. Thus, based on table 10, it appears that the negative 
indirect effect of FRA activity in the district on non-maize crop income (per table 8) is 
mainly driven by negative effects on the gross value of production of other staples. 
Again, results from Mason, Jayne, and Myers (2015) suggest no FRA effects on the 
production of other crops, so the negative FRA effect on the gross value of other staples 
appears to come mainly through negative FRA effects on other crop prices, particularly 
the price of rice, which is an important substitute for maize in Zambia.  
Our results indicate that one potential channel through which higher FRA 
activities in a district increase poverty incidence, gap and severity is through depressing 
prices for other staples, resulting in lower income from other staples, and lower non-
maize crop income more generally. This decline in income could lead to increases in 
poverty incidence, gap, and severity. Wealthier households (e.g., those with more land, 
farm equipment, or livestock) are more likely to be able to sell to FRA (see table 2 and 
table A1 in the appendix). In contrast, poorer households are less able to produce a 
marketable surplus and sell to FRA and thus benefit little from direct participation in 
FRA. Poorer households also appear to be more likely to bear the negative externalities 
of the program as evidenced by negative indirect FRA effects on the poverty metrics but 
generally not on total income or per capita income on average across all households. In 
general, the results suggest that households that are able to sell to the FRA experience a 
welfare increase, while on average households in districts with greater FRA activity 
experience a welfare decline.  
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Thus far we have focused on income-based measures of household welfare. To 
conclude the analysis we explore whether FRA participation affects a non-income-based 
measure of welfare: household calorie availability per adult equivalent (AE) per day.
29
 
The FE and IV results in tables 12 and 13, respectively, indicate that selling to FRA and 
the quantity sold to FRA do not have a significant effect on a household’s calories 
available per AE per day. However, the FE model (which is the preferred specification 
based on the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests) indicates that more intense FRA activity in a 
district has a negative effect on calories available per AE per day. Thus, we find some 
evidence that greater FRA purchases in a household’s district not only exacerbate 
poverty, but that it also reduces a non-income-based welfare measure: calorie availability. 
The negative indirect effects of the FRA on calorie availability could be due, inter alia, to 
its negative effects on per capita incomes of the poor (households have less money to 
purchase food); its price-increasing effects on wholesale and retail maize prices (making 
it more expensive for households to purchase food) (Mason and Myers 2013; Sitko and 
Kuteya 2013); and its negative effects on maize availability in rural and urban markets as 




Conclusion and Policy Implications  
Over the last two decades, there has been a renewed interest among African policymakers 
in using crop purchase programs to raise incomes and reduce poverty among smallholder 
farmers in east and southern Africa. However, to date, there is very limited empirical 
evidence on the welfare effects of these programs. This article used household panel data 
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and both fixed effects and instrumental variables approaches to estimate the smallholder 
farm household welfare effects of one such program: the Zambian Food Reserve Agency 
(FRA). The results suggest that, other factors constant, on average FRA activities have 
large, positive direct welfare effects on smallholder households that sell maize to the 
Agency, but even larger negative indirect welfare effects on smallholder households in 
districts where the FRA purchases more maize. Consequently, the results indicate that the 
benefits of FRA participation for smallholders are restricted to those who actually sell to 
the Agency, and that smallholder households that are not able to sell to the FRA may 
actually be harmed by its activities.  Despite nearly 20 years of FRA involvement in 
maize marketing and with nearly 50% of Zambia’s agricultural sector Poverty Reduction 
Program expenditures devoted to the FRA each year (MFNP, various years), rural 
poverty rates in Zambia have remained near 80% (CSO, 2009, 2011). Furthermore, the 
welfare-reducing indirect effects of the FRA call into question its viability as a poverty 
reduction tool.  
 Although reallocation of funds currently spent on the FRA to other poverty 
alleviation programs or investments may be more cost-effective at improving smallholder 
welfare, FRA activities are highly politicized and ending FRA participation in maize 
marketing in Zambia is unlikely to be politically feasible. Thus, it is useful to consider 
how FRA’s maize purchase program might be modified to improve its impacts on 
smallholder farmers’ welfare. Although further research is needed on this topic, some 
potential modifications related to the findings of this article are as follows.   
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First, our results indicate that those households that are able to sell to the FRA 
experience sizeable improvements in welfare. Yet relatively few smallholder households 
(e.g., 10% in 2007/08 and 27% in 2011/12) actually sell to the FRA, and these tend to be 
households with more land. Reducing the barriers to FRA participation by smallholders 
could improve the distributional effects of the program. Many smallholder households do 
not sell to the FRA because they do not produce a marketable surplus. For example, in 
2011/12, which was a bumper maize harvest year, only 42% of Zambian smallholders 
were net sellers of maize; the remaining 58% were either maize autarkic (30%) or net 
buyers (28%) (CSO/MAL/IAPRI 2012). Raising smallholder productivity so that more 
households are able to produce a marketable surplus of maize could open up the 
possibility of selling to the FRA to more households, even holding constant the total 
quantity of maize purchased by the Agency.  
 Second, reducing the transactions costs associated with selling to the FRA could 
also make it a more viable option for smallholder farmers. Poorer households that 
produce enough to sell to the FRA may be discouraged from doing so due to the frequent 
long and uncertain delays between when farmers deliver their maize to the FRA and 
when they receive payment. For example, in 2011/12, farmers were paid for only 23% of 
their sales transactions to the FRA within one month of delivery; the median time to 
payment was two months, and the 75th and 90th percentiles were three and four months, 
respectively (CSO/MAL/IAPRI 2012). While wealthier households may be able to wait 
months to be paid, this is much more difficult for poorer, cash-constrained households. 
Encouraging smallholders with small marketable surpluses to bulk their product with 
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others before selling to the FRA might also help to reduce the transactions costs 
experienced by individual farmers. 
 Third, our results coupled with those of Chapoto and Jayne (2011) and Sitko and 
Jayne (2014) suggest that FRA maize purchase activities are likely reducing private 
sector trading activity for maize and other crops. While further analysis is needed to 
identify the causal effects of the FRA on private trading activity, it may be possible to 
modify FRA’s purchase modalities to crowd in the private sector. One option would be 
reverting back to FRA’s initial approach of purchasing maize through private traders (at 
market prices) rather than setting up its own buying depots (Mason and Myers 2013).
30
 
Purchasing maize through the Zambia Agricultural Commodities Exchange (ZAMACE) 
is another possibility. A third option to consider is focusing FRA purchases on relatively 
remote areas where the private sector is not actively engaged in crop trading.  
Finally, government investment in rural infrastructure and market information 
systems could help to improve smallholders’ access to markets and increase their 
bargaining power and the farmgate prices they receive for their crops. Our findings 
indicate that careful consideration of these and other options to raise farmer incomes and 
reduce poverty are necessary. Despite its goals of securing Zambia’s national food 
reserve and taking wealth to rural Zambia, FRA’s direct participation in maize marketing 
may be doing more harm than good to the vast majority of Zambian smallholders. 
 
Notes
                                                          
1
 These marketing agencies were usually very specialized in scope and scale. 
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2
 They taxed agriculture with over-valued exchange rates or price fixing (on export crops) 
or by fixing consumer prices below market prices for food crops (Barrett and 
Mutambatsere 2005). 
3
 In Zambia, smallholders are defined as farm households that cultivate less than 20 
hectares of land.  
4
 The majority of Zambian smallholders are maize net buyers or maize autarkic. For 
example, in 2007/08, an average to slightly above average maize production year, 49% 
were net buyers, 23% neither bought nor sold maize (i.e., were autarkic), and 28% were 
net sellers. In 2011/12, a bumper maize harvest year, 28% were net buyers, 30% were 
autarkic, and 42% were net sellers (Mason, Jayne, and Myers 2012). 
5
 The official rural poverty rate in Zambia was 83% in 1998, 78% in 2004, 80% in 2006, 
and 78% in 2010, the last year for which official rural poverty rates have been released 
(CSO, 2009, 2011).  These poverty rates are based on the national poverty line and are 
consumption/expenditure-based. In this article, our poverty measures are based on the 
US$1.25/capita/day poverty line, are income-based, and are for smallholder farmers, not 
the broader rural population. 
6
 The second is the Farmer Input Support Program (FISP), a targeted hybrid maize seed 
and fertilizer subsidy program. Between 2004 and 2011, the FRA and FISP each 
accounted for an average of roughly 30% of total agricultural sector spending and 48% of 
agricultural sector Poverty Reduction Program spending (Mason, Jayne, and Myers 
2015).  
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7
 The panel data cover the 2000/01, 2003/04, and 2007/08 marketing years. Per table 1 
and Mason, Jayne, and Myers (2015), FRA purchased no maize from smallholders in 
2000/01 due to funding shortfalls. Its maize purchases in 2003/04 and 2007/08 were 
equivalent to 21% and 74% of smallholders’ maize sales, respectively.  
8
 The FRA did not purchase maize domestically during the 2000/01 marketing year; it 
purchased maize in 36 of 72 districts in 2003/04, and expanded its buying presence to 58 
of 72 districts by 2007/08. 
9
 Mason and Tembo (2015) use a similar conceptual framework in their study of the 
effects of Zambia’s input subsidy program on smallholder welfare. 
10
 Henceforth we refer to an increase in the level of maize purchases by the FRA in a 
district as an increase in ‘FRA activity’. We focus on the district level because this is the 
most disaggregated level at which administrative data on total FRA purchases are 
available. 
11
 An increase in maize purchases by the FRA would shift the private sector supply curve 
to the left, ceteris paribus (Mason and Myers 2013). Even if the private sector maize 
price (e.g., the price offered by private traders) is lower than the FRA price, farmers 
might choose to sell to the private trader to avoid some of the transactions costs 
associated with selling to FRA. For example, whereas private traders typically pay cash 
at the time of sale, it takes weeks if not months for farmers to be paid by the FRA, and 
farmers often need to spend hours waiting in line at FRA depots to deliver their maize. 
12
 FRA activity could also affect household incomes by affecting the production of other 
crops; however, Mason, Jayne, and Myers (2015) find no evidence of such effects. 
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13
 SEAs are the most disaggregated geographic unit in the data set and contain 
approximately 150-200 households or two to four villages.  
14
 Moisture stress periods are defined as the number of 20-day periods with less than 40 
mm of rainfall during the November-March growing season. 
15
 Prime-age is defined as 15-59 years old in this article. 
16
 Subsidized fertilizer and seed are allocated in fixed proportions at the district level, so 
it is not necessary to include the district-level allocations of both subsidized fertilizer and 
seed.  
17
 Non-maize crops are much less frequently marketed than maize, so there are not 
enough sales price observations on non-maize crops to compute district median producer 
prices; provincial median prices are used instead.  
18
 The US$1.25/capita/day poverty line is calculated based on the 2005 purchasing power 
parity exchange rate for Zambian Kwacha (ZMK) to US dollars, inflated or deflated to 
the survey years using the consumer price index. 
19
 Both the FE approach and the CRE approach (also known as the Mundlak-
Chamberlain device) require the assumption of strict exogeneity of the explanatory 
variables conditional on the time invariant heterogeneity to be consistent. In addition to 
this assumption, the CRE approach requires the assumption that the time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity is a function of the time-averages of the time-varying 
explanatory variables in the model. See Wooldridge (2010) for further details on the FE 
estimator and the CRE approach. 
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20
 The full regression results are reported for tables 4 and A1 only. Due to the large 
number of regressions, for other tables we report only the key parameter estimates of 
interest. Full regressions results for other tables are available from the authors upon 
request.  
21
  In addition to the linear fixed effects results for poverty incidence presented in table 4, 
we also estimated CRE probit models for this binary dependent variable. The poverty 
incidence results are robust to our choice of estimator. 
22
 Table 16 shows the F-stat and p-value for the test of the significance of the instrument. 
Though the F-stat only satisfies Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb of F greater than 
10 for the sell to FRA specification, this rule is more relevant when testing the joint 
significance of multiple instruments. In our case we have only one instrument and, the 
size and significance of the instruments estimate in the first stage suffices. In our case this 
estimate is large which suggests that the instrument is not weak. Moreover in both our 
sell to FRA and quantity sold to FRA specifications, we can reject the null that the 
instrument is not significant in the first stage given the p-value in the F test. 
23
 Since the IV results are based on the 2008 SS data only, we do not emphasize 
differences in magnitude between the FE and IV estimates. 
24
 For the other specifications, we reject the null hypothesis that selling to FRA and the 
quantity of maize sold to FRA are exogenous, indicating that the IV specification is 
preferred over FE. 
25
 We also run all our estimations using the log values of income and values of 
production and our results are largely maintained. Some of these results are presented in 
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tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix. We also ran all our estimations on winsorized values 
of our continuous dependent variables to ensure our results were not being driven by 
outliers. Rather than dropping extreme values, winsorizing replaces extreme or outliers 
beyond a specific percentile with the value observed at that percentile. The main results 
in the paper are robust to the use of winsorized values.  
26
 Agricultural wage income is total agricultural off-farm wage income (both cash and in-
kind). Other income is total income minus all crop income and agricultural wage income.  
27
 To confirm that these negative results are not driven by the fact that higher FRA 
activity likely occurs in areas with high potential for maize production and thus less 
likely to be producing other staples, we also ran all regressions using data only from the 
main maize producing areas and our results are maintained. 
28
 Other staples are sorghum, rice, millet, Irish potato, sweet potato, and cassava. High 
value crops are groundnuts, mixed beans, bambara nuts, cowpeas, velvet beans, kenaf, 
and cashew. And cash crops are sunflower, soybeans, seed cotton, Virginia tobacco, 
burley tobacco, coffee, paprika, and popcorn.  
29
 Calorie availability is estimated as the calories from own crop production that is 
retained (and not sold), calories from purchased staple foods (the surveys did not capture 
purchases of non-staples), and calories from retained own production of milk and eggs. 
See Wineman (2013) for details.  
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TABLES 
Table 1. FRA Maize Pan-territorial Purchase Prices and Quantities, 









FRA domestic maize 
purchases (MT) 
FRA purchases as 
% of small-holder 
maize sales 
1996/1997 236 10,500 3.7 
1997/1998 157.6 4,989 2.4 
1998/1999 N/A 0 0 
1999/2000 N/A 0 0 
2000/2001 N/A 0 0 
2001/2002 N/A 0 0 
2002/2003 800
b
 23,535 16.4 
2003/2004 600 54,847 21.0 
2004/2005 720 105,279 31.8 
2005/2006 720 78,667 51.9 
2006/2007 760 389,510 85.7 
2007/2008 760 396,450 74.3 
2008/2009 900
c
 73,876 14.2 
2009/2010 1300 198,630 32.4 
2010/2011 1300 883,036 83.1 
2011/2012 1300 1,751,660 122.5 
2012/2013 1300 1,045,895 72.6 
2013/2014 1300
d
 426,454 35.1 
2014/2015 1500
d
  1,031,303  29.6 
Note: 
a
Prices in 1996/97 and 1997/98 are averages across districts where the FRA was active. 
b
Initial price of K600 raised to K800 in Aug. 2002. 
c
Increased to K1,100 in Sep. 2008. N/A = 
Not applicable. FRA was not buying in 1998/99 through 2001/02 so there was no FRA pan-
territorial price in those years. 
d
As of January 1, 2013, Zambia rebased its currency by dividing 
the old currency (ZMK) levels by 1,000. The new currency is called ZMW. Values reported 
above are all in old currency (ZMK) units.  





Table 2.  Maize Sales to the FRA by Smallholder Farm Households  





% of  
smallholder  
HHs 
% of HHs in 
category 
selling to FRA 
Mean kg of maize sold to FRA Category % of 
total maize sold to 
FRA by smallholders All HHs 
HHs selling 
to FRA 
0-0.99 ha 30.3 2.2  11   529  1.3 
1-1.99 ha 34.8 7.6  79   1,040  10.2 
2-4.99 ha 28.3 16.1  339   2,109  35.8 
5+ ha 6.5 28.4  2,161   7,608  52.7 
All HHs 100.0 9.7  268   2,764  100.0 





Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables      
Gross household income (ZMK) 12858 4949863 18300000 0 1240000000 
Per capita income (ZMK) 12858 787567 2315816 0 137000000 
Poverty incidence (1=poor) 12858 0.90 0.30 0 1 
Poverty gap 12858 0.66 0.31 0 1 
Poverty severity 12858 0.53 0.32 0 1 
Maize income (ZMK) 12858 1168465 3399894 0 154000000 
Non-maize crop income (ZMK) 12858 788284 1665414 0 180000000 
Agricultural wage income (ZMK) 12858 69527 561386 0 18000000 
Other income (ZMK) 12858 2923588 17300000 -2 1240000000 
Calories availability per person per day 12858 3402.7 4323.3 0 187688.7 
 
Conditional on selling to FRA:      
Gross household income (ZMK) 520 13900000 24800000 688116 265000000 
Per capita income (ZMK) 520 1707809 2936618 98302 32700000 
Poverty incidence (1=poor) 520 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Poverty gap 520 0.40 0.32 0 0.94 
Poverty severity 520 0.26 0.25 0 0.88 
Maize income (ZMK) 520 5610817 8745122 304000 116000000 
Non-maize crop income (ZMK) 520 1198865 3011456 0 51000000 
Agricultural wage income (ZMK) 520 37748 361547 0 6840000 
Other income (ZMK) 520 7071049 19100000 -0.25 245000000 
Calories availability per person per day 520 4417 4266 80 53501 
      
Main explanatory variables      
Sold to FRA (=1) 12858 0.035 0.184 0 1 
Quantity of maize sold to FRA (kg), including zeroes 12858 95.35 1060.05 0 70000 
Quantity of maize sold to FRA (kg), excluding zeroes 520 2731.32 5003.32 50 70000 
Normalized district-level maize sales to FRA  12858 108.60 210.13 0 3440.10 
(kg/agric. HH) 
      
Instrumental variable      
Distance from homestead to nearest FRA depot (km) 4286 22.88 32.65 0 222.5 
      
Control variables      
Maize producer price, district median t-1 (ZMK/kg) 12858 475 181 179 1043 
Groundnut producer price, provincial median t-1 
(ZMK/kg) 12858 1199 369 652 2000 
Mixed beans producer price, provincial median t-1 
(ZMK/kg) 12858 1166 321 667 2167 




District commercial fertilizer price (ZMK/kg) 12858 2023 283 1083 2828 
District wage for weeding (ZMK) 12858 41.0 14.5 15 131.9 
Education of household head (years) 12854 5.03 3.70 0 19 
Male-headed household (=1) 12858 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Number of children under 5 12858 0.81 0.94 0 12 
Number of children aged 5 to 14 12858 2.02 1.65 0 19 
Number of prime age adults (aged 15 to 59) 12858 3.02 1.79 0 22 
Number of adults aged 60 and above 12858 0.38 0.63 0 4 
Landholding size (ha) 12858 2.12 2.81 0 234.05 
Value of farm equipment (ZMK) 12858 212756 731141 0 26600000 
Value of livestock (ZMK) 12858 1779884 8236531 0 571000000 
Number of moisture stress periods  12858 1.66 1.13 0 5 
Long run mean moisture stress periods  12858 2.02 0.78 0 4.13 
Growing season rainfall (mm) 12858 845 111 547 1222 
Growing season rainfall in t-1(mm) 12858 854 133 475 1215 
Growing season rainfall in t-2 (mm) 12858 895 147 477 1284 
Growing season rainfall in t-3 (mm) 12858 862 103 592 1272 
Long run mean rainfall (mm) 12858 817 94 558 1108 
Long run rainfall coefficient of variation (%) 12858 15.2 3.3 8.6 24.5 
% of households in district earning non-farm income 12858 13.4 7.3 0 51.4 
% of households in district earning business income 12858 34.1 15.4 3.8 90.4 
% of households in district earning income from other 
farms 12858 9.0 9.2 0 72.6 
Disease-related prime-age (PA) death of male 
head/spouse  12858 0.008 0.092 0 1 
Disease-related PA death of female head/spouse 12858 0.013 0.114 0 1 
Disease-related PA death of other male household 
member 12858 0.037 0.190 0 1 
Disease-related PA death of other female household 
member 12858 0.043 0.202 0 1 
Amount of government fertilizer distributed in district 
(MT/hh) 12858 0.036 0.037 0 0.725 
Number of provinces = 9      
Number of districts = 70      
Number of survey waves = 3      
Number of households in balanced panel = 4286      
      
Note: All ZMK values are in real 2008 terms. 




Table 4. Effects of Selling to the FRA on Household Income and Poverty (Fixed Effects Estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: 
Explanatory variables 
Gross income  
(ZMK) 




Poverty gap Poverty 
severity 
      
Sold to FRA (=1) 4286816.108*** 323,097.140* -0.080*** -0.135*** -0.152*** 
 (1174774.552) (164,886.974) (0.028) (0.021) (0.019) 
District maize sales to FRA -1,256.457 -235.783 0.0000500** 0.0000640*** 0.0000672*** 
    (kg per agricultural HH) (1,189.535) (146.165) (0.0000238) (0.0000239) (0.0000254) 
Number of children under 5 158,761.009 -122,122.809*** 0.017*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 
 (362,748.263) (36,673.542) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Number of children aged 5  218,660.586* -59,353.600*** 0.008*** 0.0170*** 0.019*** 
    to 14 (124,362.027) (15,590.957) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Number of prime age adults  712,560.285** 48,337.808 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005* 
    (aged 15 to 59) (324,106.983) (35,507.456) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of adults aged 60  437,032.627 7,755.901 0.006 0.002 0.001 
    and above (343,733.536) (43,222.802) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
Education of household  85,664.430 13,023.206 -0.003* -0.006*** -0.007*** 
    head (85,654.537) (11,637.266) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Male-headed household  123,919.284 63,521.319 -0.010 -0.046** -0.055*** 
    (=1) (493,013.942) (66,923.950) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) 
District wage for  -36,768.410 -5,135.626 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0008* 
    weeding (35,419.192) (4,331.649) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
% of households in district  49,641.252 8,828.758* -0.002** -0.0006 -0.0003 
    earning non-farm income (40,746.000) (5,158.743) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
% of households in district  44,734.517*** 5,437.980*** -0.0007 -0.003*** -0.003*** 
    earning business income (15,159.799) (2,091.109) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
% of households earning  -63,536.134 -7,512.181 0.0002 0.001* 0.001** 
    income from other farms (55,789.610) (6,577.638) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
District commercial  -2,733.285 -344.308 0.00001 0.00003* 0.00003** 
    fertilizer price (2,234.256) (252.828) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
Amount of gov’t fertilizer  -5733535.650 -803,243.581 0.096 0.107 0.103 
    distributed in district  (4164357.447) (607,657.626) (0.112) (0.109) (0.111) 
Maize producer price, t-1  2,638.827 508.516 -0.00004 -0.00003 -0.00001 
 (3,700.281) (489.716) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) 
Groundnut producer price, -2,477.360 -302.931 0.00001 0.00004 0.00005 
    t-1 (1,605.239) (207.143) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
Mixed beans producer price, 2,526.301 169.012 0.00005 -0.00004 -0.00009** 
    t-1 (2,119.110) (260.993) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) 
Sweet potato producer -3,214.931 -524.806 0.0001 0.0001 0.00009 
    price, t-1 (4,044.827) (566.664) (0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00008) 
Growing season rainfall  -601.312 166.848 -0.00007 -0.0002*** -0.0003*** 
 (4,209.619) (548.514) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00005) 
Growing season rainfall, t-1 -50.460 -177.668 0.00002 -0.000003 0.000009 
 (2,541.044) (399.769) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006) 
Growing season rainfall, t-2 3,273.731 200.841 0.0001 0.00005 0.00005 
 (4,547.220) (561.698) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) 
Growing season rainfall, t-3 -4,133.081 -574.837 -0.00003 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (4,497.951) (551.750) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00007) 
Long run mean rainfall 27,450.611 4,160.878 0.00005 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (23,247.745) (3,037.257) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Number of moisture stress  -467,646.976 -44,119.112 0.002 -0.006 -0.008 
    periods (532,589.825) (62,961.170) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Long run mean moisture  938,129.455 140,436.184 -0.014 -0.006 -0.013 
    stress periods (1472332.201) (227,976.121) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) 
 
 41 
Long run rainfall coefficient -82,493.989 -12,384.202 0.003 0.004 0.003 
    of variation (119,396.888) (19,450.873) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Disease-related PA death of  217,125.422 -89,810.195 0.037 0.031 0.031 
    male head/spouse (1038153.103) (143,185.879) (0.027) (0.039) (0.040) 
Disease-related PA death of -817,491.812 89,335.413 -0.029 -0.031 -0.024 
   female head/spouse (2352263.281) (325,270.755) (0.0428) (0.034) (0.031) 
Disease-related PA death of  197,358.347 -675.857 0.018 0.012 0.014 
    other male HH member (517,594.077) (73,002.766) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
Disease-related PA death of 364,621.056 3,659.981 0.009 -0.004 -0.006 
    other female HH member (624,145.306) (64,645.884) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) 
Landholding size 201,752.439 44,313.778 -0.006 -0.012* -0.013** 
 (321,007.240) (32,962.718) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Value of farm equipment 2.622 0.313 -0.0000000** -0.0000000*** -0.0000000*** 
     (1.860) (0.211) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) 
Value of livestock  0.006 0.003 -0.0000000*** -0.0000000* -0.0000000 
 (0.147) (0.017) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) (0.0000000) 
2004 survey year dummy -30,328.600 57,476.004 -0.033 -0.073*** -0.091*** 
 (1722045.092) (214,848.337) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) 
2008 survey year dummy -678,005.879 -135,196.744 -0.044 0.030 0.056 
 (3036440.544) (370,389.854) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) 
Constant -1.523e+07 -1732741.223 0.793* 1.408*** 1.451*** 
 (16475558.292) (2336125.275) (0.444) (0.427) (0.444) 
      
Observations 12,854 12,854 12,854 12,854 12,854 
R-squared 0.525 0.521 0.536 0.615 0.608 






Table 5. Effects of the Quantity of Maize Sold to the FRA on Household Income and Poverty  
(Fixed Effects Estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 







Poverty gap Poverty 
severity 
      
Quantity of maize sold  1,774.914*** 130.187*** -0.0000179*** -0.0000131*** -0.0000099** 
    to FRA (kg) (455.605) (47.923) (0.0000047) (0.0000045) (0.0000045) 
District maize sales to     -1,222.155 -231.976* 0.0000441* 0.0000483** 0.0000479* 
    FRA (kg per agri. HH) (1,133.750) (140.820) (0.0000234) (0.0000241) (0.0000257) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 12,854 12,854 12,854 12,854 12,854 
R-squared 0.530 0.522 0.537 0.613 0.604 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by households; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The control variables 





Table 6. Effects of Selling to the FRA on Household Income and Poverty in 2008  
(IV with CRE Estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 







Poverty gap Poverty severity 
 
First Stage Regressions (effect of instrument on whether household sold to FRA) 











    depot (km) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00017) 
      
 
Second Stage Regressions 
Sold to FRA (=1) 19873094.225** 1986109.327** -0.266 -0.598*** -0.672*** 
 (9116730.935) (982,169.505) (0.194) (0.211) (0.223) 
District maize sales to 
FRA 
-27,767.849 -2,991.768 0.000143 0.000255** 0.000274** 
    (kg per agricultural 
HH) 
(18,653.795) (2,066.023) (0.000116) (0.000123) (0.000131) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CRE time averages Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DWH test 3.679 2.527 0.625 3.424 4.324 
P-value 0.055 0.112 0.429 0.064 0.0378 
Observations 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,283 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The control variables included in the 






Table 7. Effects of the Quantity of Maize Sold to the FRA on Household Income and Poverty in 
2008 (IV with CRE Estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 








Poverty gap Poverty severity 
 
First Stage Regressions (effect of instrument on quantity of maize sold to FRA) 
Distance to nearest FRA -1.841*** -1.841*** -1.841*** -1.841*** -1.841*** 
    depot (km) (0.788) (0.788) (0.788) (0.788) (0.788) 
      
 
Second Stage Regressions 
Quantity of maize sold to  10,576.915* 1,057.095* -0.000142 -0.000318** -0.000358** 
    FRA (kg) (5,784.315) (608.400) (0.000109) (0.000157) (0.000176) 
District maize sales to 
FRA 
-28,258.119 -3,040.782 0.000140 0.000269* 0.000290* 
    (kg per agricultural 
HH) 
(19,374.704) (2,134.764) (0.000122) (0.0001545) (0.000172) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CRE time averages Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DWH  test 3.605 3.091 1.245 8.173 9.887 
P-value 0.058 0.079 0.265 0.004 0.002 
Observations 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,283 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The control variables included in the 





Table 8. Effects of FRA Participation on Different Sources of Income (Fixed Effects Estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 















         
Sold to FRA (=1) 2888215.184*** -45,922.673 -19,773.585 1464297.177     
 (377,414.694) (202,099.767) (26,565.659) (952,590.063)     
Quantity of maize      1,087.970*** 158.619 -3.937 532.263** 
  sold to FRA (kg)     (171.348) (181.123) (4.033) (262.910) 
District maize sales  155.052 -409.252** 51.676 -1,053.933 214.881 -470.086** 50.072 -1,017.021 
  to FRA (kg/agric. 
HH) 
(419.482) (167.019) (86.224) (1,029.873) (361.880) (186.125) (86.609) (1,020.393) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year 
dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 12,854 12,854 12,854 12,854 12,854 12,854 12,854 12,854 
R-squared 0.673 0.471 0.562 0.497 0.730 0.477 0.562 0.498 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by households; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The control variables included in 






Table 9. Effects of FRA Participation on Different Sources of Income in 2008 (IV with CREE) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent 
variable: 












                   
First Stage (effect on whether household sold to FRA)              
 
First Stage (effect on quantity of maize sold to FRA) 








 -1.841*** -1.841*** -1.841*** -1.841*** 
  nearest FRA 
  depot (km) 
(0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.788) (0.788) (0.788) (0.788) 
  
Second Stage Regressions 
         
Sold to FRA  2159489.496 693,333.182 -143,960.400 17164231.860*     
(=1) (1469406.708) (700,725.792) (186,763.215) (8820744.694)     
Quantity of      1,149.465** 369.133 -76.596 9,134.912 
    maize sold to  
    FRA (kg) 
    (571.765) (350.308) (103.836) (5,777.162) 
District maize  8.349 -566.556 -269.147* -26,940.495 -44.979 -583.711 -265.604 -27,363.826 
    sales to FRA  
   (kg/agric. HH) 
(818.268) (377.794) (163.206) (18,884.666) (667.197) (391.069) (163.824) (19,552.744) 
Control 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CRE time 
averages 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DWH  test 0.169 0.673 0.503 4.001 0.074 0.441 0.538 3.760 
P-value 0.681 0.412 0.478 0.046 0.785 0.507 0.463 0.053 
Observations 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,283 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The control variables included in the regressions include all 




Table 10. Effects of FRA Participation on the Gross Value of Production of Other Crops 
 (Fixed Effects Estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Other staples High value 
crops 





       
Sold to FRA (=1) -108,530.062* 36,259.351 26,523.902    
 (65,672.233) (38,743.835) (217,594.853)    
Quantity of maize     3.880 7.806 138.683 
    sold to FRA (kg)    (18.282) (7.230) (187.477) 
District maize sales to  -325.283*** 8.738 99.806 -342.768*** 11.481 56.549 
    FRA (kg per  
    agricultural HH) 
(58.880) (29.155) (268.719) (59.480) (29.167) (277.534) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 12,854 12,854 12,854 12,854 12,854 12,854 
R-squared 0.473 0.551 0.452 0.473 0.551 0.453 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by households; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The control variables 







Table 11. Effects of FRA Participation on the Gross Value of Production of Other Crops in 2008 
(IV with CRE Estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 










                                              
                                                   First Stage                                                                          First Stage 
                                (effect on whether household sold to FRA)         (effect on quantity of maize sold to FRA) 






 -1.841*** -1.841*** -1.841*** 
    depot (km) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.788) (0.788) (0.788) 
 
Second Stage Regressions 
Sold to FRA (=1) -2,742.420 122,449.218 -1325065.732    
 (423,337.414) (225,553.180) (923,299.494)    
Quantity of maize     -1.388 65.209 -705.086 
    sold to FRA (kg)    (225.319) (123.994) (613.627) 
District maize sales to  -628.316* 148.616 -563.378 -628.277* 145.580 -530.746 
   FRA (kg per agri. HH) (321.949) (131.179) (386.186) (325.180) (135.226) (467.744) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CRE time averages Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DWH  test 0.072 0.023 1.832 0.178 0.249 3.460 
P-value 0.789 0.879 0.176 0.673 0.618 0.063 
Observations 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,283 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The control variables included in the 
regressions include all those highlighted in table 4 as well as agro-ecological region and district dummies. All values are in 






Table 12. Effects of FRA Participation On Calories Availability 
(Fixed Effects Estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: Calories Availability 
(per person per day) 
Calories Availability 
(per person per day) 
Sold to FRA (=1) 315.915  
 (283.891)  
Quantity of maize sold   0.004 
    to FRA (kg)  (0.004) 
District maize sales to FRA -1.154*** -1.110*** 
    (kg per agricultural HH) (0.335) (0.340) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Survey year dummies Yes Yes 
   
Observations 12,854 12,854 
R-squared 0.469 0.469 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by households; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.10. The control variables included in the regressions are the same as in table 4. All 





Table 13. Effects of FRA Participation on Calorie Availability In 2008 
(IV with CRE Estimates) 
      
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: Calorie Availability 
(per person per day) 
Calorie Availability 
(per person per day) 
  
First Stage Regressions 
Distance to nearest FRA  -00098
***
 -1.841*** 
    depot (km) (0.00017) (0.788) 
  
Second Stage Regressions 
Sold to FRA (=1) 2,405.906  
 (2,737.828)  
Quantity of maize   1.281 
    sold to FRA (kg)  (1.552) 
District maize sales to FRA     -2.196 -2.255 
    (kg per agricultural HH) (1.544) (1.631) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
District dummies Yes Yes 
CRE time averages Yes Yes 
DWH  test 0.474 0.760 
P-value 0.491 0.383 
Observations 4,283 4,283 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The 
control variables included in the regressions include all those highlighted in table 4 as 








Table A1. First Stage Regression Results for IV/CRE Model (OLS with CRE Estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: 
Explanatory variables 
Sold to FRA  
(=1) 
Quantity of maize 
sold to FRA (kg) 
   
Distance to nearest FRA depot (km)  -0.000980*** -1.842** 
 (0.000) (0.788) 
District maize sales to FRA (kg per agricultural HH) 0.000072* 0.159 
 (0.000) (0.192) 
Number of children under 5 0.000872 4.664 
 (0.007) (47.664) 
Number of children aged 5 to 14 0.001069 -13.695 
 (0.005) (28.902) 
Number of prime age adults (aged 15 to 59) 0.007827* -25.540 
 (0.004) (23.742) 
Number of adults aged 60 and above -0.011521 -142.021** 
 (0.014) (55.892) 
Education of household head 0.000428 13.591 
 (0.003) (10.689) 
Male-headed household (=1) 0.043786** 47.232 
 (0.020) (73.785) 
District wage for weeding -0.001447* -6.052 
 (0.001) (4.721) 
% of households in district earning non-farm income 0.002798 11.993 
 (0.003) (16.673) 
% of households in district earning business income -0.003838** -15.137*** 
 (0.002) (5.871) 
% of households in district earning income from other farms 0.009377*** 8.297 
 (0.003) (12.696) 
District commercial fertilizer price -0.000569*** -1.277 
 (0.000) (0.936) 
Maize producer price, t-1 -0.000811*** -1.914* 
 (0.000) (1.009) 
Groundnut producer price, t-1 0.001128** 1.122 
 (0.000) (2.060) 
Mixed beans producer price, t-1 -0.000170 -0.649 
 (0.000) (1.157) 
Sweet potato producer price, t-1 -0.003283*** -6.043** 
 (0.001) (2.385) 
Growing season rainfall 0.000040 -0.382 
 (0.000) (0.990) 
Growing season rainfall, t-1 -0.000348 -2.173** 
 (0.000) (1.106) 
Growing season rainfall, t-2 0.000024 0.902 
 (0.000) (1.151) 
Growing season rainfall, t-3 -0.000394 -4.824*** 
 (0.000) (1.574) 
Long run mean growing season rainfall 0.002620 13.181 
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 (0.002) (11.025) 
Long run mean moisture stress periods 0.018801 381.475 
 (0.094) (429.918) 
Long run rainfall coefficient of variation 0.027295* 134.096** 
 (0.015) (63.647) 
Disease-related PA death of male head/spouse -0.046690 -195.286 
 (0.065) (574.149) 
Disease-related PA death of female head/spouse -0.003402 112.341 
 (0.068) (283.051) 
Disease-related PA death of other male HH member 0.051230* 186.762 
 (0.030) (125.324) 
Disease-related PA death of other female HH member -0.013554 -123.598 
 (0.028) (102.001) 
Landholding size 0.013453*** 201.249** 
 (0.005) (79.149) 
Value of farm equipment 0.000000* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Value of livestock  0.000000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Km from the SEA to the nearest district town 0.000798*** 1.993 
 (0.000) (1.214) 
Km from the SEA to the nearest main road 0.000136 -1.847 
 (0.000) (1.475) 
Km from the SEA to the nearest feeder road -0.004095*** -11.342 
 (0.002) (7.134) 
Number of moisture stress periods  0.014490 110.608* 
 (0.016) (64.953) 
Constant -0.666979 -3,014.097 
 (0.758) (3,032.649) 
Agro-ecological region dummies Yes Yes 
District dummies Yes Yes 
CRE time averages Yes Yes 
   
Observations 4,283 4,283 
R-squared 0.168 0.233 
p-value for excluded instrument 0.000 0.020 
F-statistic for excluded instrument 34.82 5.46 




Table A2. Effects of FRA Participation on Log Income (Fixed Effects Estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Ln(gross income) Ln(per capita income) Ln(gross income) Ln(per capita income) 
Sold to FRA (=1) 0.541557*** 0.530572***   
 (0.062531) (0.065687)   
Quantity of maize sold    0.000051*** 0.000049*** 
    to FRA (kg)   (0.000015) (0.000015) 
District maize sales to FRA -0.000227** -0.000235** -0.000163* -0.000172* 
    (kg per agricultural HH) (0.000089) (0.000093) (0.000089) (0.000093) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 12,813 12,813 12,813 12,813 
R-squared 0.659 0.612 0.656 0.609 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by households; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The control variables included 













Table A3. Effects of FRA Participation on Log Income in 2008 (IV with CRE Estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Ln(gross income) Ln(per capita income) Ln(gross income) Ln(per capita income) 
Sold to FRA (=1) 2.446*** 2.306***   
 (0.809) (0.809)   
Quantity of maize    0.001** 0.001** 
    sold to FRA (kg)   (0.001) (0.001) 
District maize sales to  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
    FRA (kg per agri. HH) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CRE time averages Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 4,274 4,274 4,274 4,274 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The control variables included in the regressions are 
the same as in table 4.  
